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Radical Uncertainty: Judith Butler and a theory of character
Abstract:
This paper will develop a theory of character based on Judith Butler’s ideas of
subjectivity and gender construction. It will summarise Butler’s position and explore
the practicalities of reading realist characters as performative repetitions. Then, it will
discuss Butler’s notion of agency and the subversive repetition, and how realist
characters can demonstrate the radical uncertainty inherent in Butler’s notion of
agency – specifically when texts are rewritten in such a way that characters ‘question’
their ‘original’ depictions. The example of interest here will be Jean Rhys’s Wide
Sargasso Sea in relation to Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre, with particular attention paid
to the character of Antoinette/Bertha. I will argue that reading for instances of
Butlerian agency is an ethical enterprise because it disrupts humanist assumptions
regarding character. Finally, despite the inherent problematics of assuming an
intentioning subject in this context, I ask writers and readers to consider hidden
narratives within narratives in light of an ethics of representation.
Biographical Note:
Dr Shady Cosgrove is a Senior Lecturer in Creative Writing at the University of
Wollongong.
Her book She Played Elvis was shortlisted for the 2007
Australian/Vogel Literary Prize and published by Allen and Unwin in 2009. Her short
fiction has been published in Southerly, Antipodes, Hecate and Best Australian Short
Stories.
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Introduction
Structuralists have been quick to dismiss the character as a product of the text,
nothing more than a series of repeating signs. As literary theorist Roland Barthes
asserts: ‘When identical semes traverse the same proper name several times and
appear to settle upon it, a character is created’ (1970: 67). I appreciate this stance was
adopted in part as a reaction to a pre-structuralism that pitted the character as a
romantic representation of the liberal humanist subject. However this dismissal fails
to take into account the role that character plays for many readers and the affective
power that fictional characters can have. Emotional responses to fiction and the
characters therein have attracted much recent academic attention across many fields
(by theorists such as philosopher Susan Feagin [2009], narratologist Suzanne Keen
[2006], feminist theorist and writer Molly Hite [2010] and literary theorist Dorothy
Hale [2007] to name a few).
However, anyone considering the character as a representation of the human
subject is relying on assumptions of what the human subject is. As literary theorist
James Phelan notes:
Silently underlying this discussion of the mimetic component (of the fictional
character) are some messy problems. First, all this talk about characters as plausible
or possible persons presupposes that we know what a person is. But the nature of the
human subject is of course a highly contested issue among contemporary thinkers
(Phelan, 1989: 11)

The idea that fictional characters are read as ‘people’ is fundamental to many
interrogations of character and a viable theory of character must take into account the
influence of the mimetic, or how characters are constructed as ‘imitation people’. But
as Phelan illustrates the notion of reading characters as ‘people’ is problematised in
light of the complex nature of the human subject. If we can’t agree on the nature of
the human subject, how can we agree on the nature of a representation of the human
subject?
In this paper, I propose a theory of character using Judith Butler's work on
subjection as a means to explore the complexity of character in light of the ‘messy
problem’ of the mimetic. I then explore Butler’s notion of agency and how this
impacts on a Butlerian reading of character. I call for reading and writing that keeps
in mind the radical uncertainty of character, something illustrated by characters who
appear in multiple texts such as Jane Eyre’s Bertha who becomes Antoinette in Wide
Sargasso Sea (or vice-versa). Rewriting fictional characters in this context can be an
ethical enterprise, of interest to those concerned with issues of representation and
political subversion.

Butler’s gendered subjectivity: performative repetitions and agency
Intentional or not, Butler's work examines notions which link with literary characters
– like identity formation, subjection, repetition and language. In her early work
(especially her pivotal 1990 text Gender Trouble) Butler grapples with the idea of the
performative and how it fashions the gendered subject. In that text, Butler uses
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examples of gender to illustrate how the subject is formed through a series of
repetitions that offer the effect of a consistent and unified self. Gender, for Butler, is
achieved through repeated acts, where the acts themselves actually constitute the
gendered subject instead of expressing it. Any idea of a consistent self that could
choose to enact his/her identity whimsically violates the very concepts that Butler
espouses (hence, I can’t decide to be a man and subvert my identity).
Such acts, gestures, enactment, generally construed, are performative in the
sense that the essence or identity that they otherwise purport to express are
fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other
discursive means (1990: 173).

The acts and gestures themselves, the fabrications, are created and continued through
corporeal and discursive means, that is, through the body and/or through language.
Examples of gendered performative acts and gestures include things as superficial as
applying make-up or entering the women's toilets. These acts compile, producing a
gendered sense of identity for the subject. Butler argues that our ideas of gender and
our ideas of self are fashioned through these repetitions. We are not people who then
repeat things, these repetitions are what create us as people.

So for Butler, the idea that ‘one’ exists, that Shady Cosgrove simply ‘is’ is an illusion.
For Butler, there is no intrinsic self (as developed in Gender Trouble [1990],
discussed in Bodies that Matter [1992] and revisited again when Gender Trouble was
republished in 1999 with a new introduction). There is no core gender or a core self.
The structural frame of obligatory reproductive heterosexuality offers the notion of
this core as an illusion that hides the self as a series of performative repetitions.
However, while the subject is fashioned by them, that is not to say she is determined
by them. As Butler says:
The subject is not determined by the rules through which it is generated because
signification is not a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition that
both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through the production of
substantializing effects . . . (1990: 185)

Because the repetitions which form the subject's identity never finish, gender identity
is never secured. The ongoing nature of the performative repetition, the ‘regulated
process of repetition’ is not fixed, that is, the subject is not entirely at the mercy of the
structures that regulate gender-legitimating norms. Because the norm can never be
fulfilled completely, because there will always be norms which ‘are and are not
realizable’ (1990: 126), gender can only be approximated. For Butler, being gendered
will always be unstable. The category of man or woman will be shrouded in
ambivalence because the norm can never fully determine the subject. Because the
norm is dependent on repeating – resignifying – to fulfill the performative repetition,
and because the norm can never be fully realized, there is room for these norms to be
subverted. This is the crux of Butler’s notion of agency.
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For Butler, agency is radically different from the western liberal concept of agency
that sees an agent intend to accomplish something and then do so. Butlerian agency is
much more tenuous; it exists when a repetition of the subject mutates or deforms
subversively, exposing its construction. As Butler states: ‘“agency” … is to be
located within the possibility of a variation on that repetition’ (1990: 185). The
example Butler offers is that of drag and how the drag queen can reproduce femininity
in a way that exposes its construction. That is, if a man dresses as a woman or a
woman dresses as a man ‘one takes the first term of each of those perceptions as the
“reality” of gender’ and the introduced gender is somehow ‘artifice, play, falsehood,
and illusion’ (1990: xxii). The idea that there is a real gender under the illusion is
questioned:
(t)he moment in which one’s staid and usual cultural perceptions fail, when one
cannot with surety read the body that one sees… [w]hen such categories come into
question … we come to understand that what we take to be ‘real’, what we invoke as
the naturalized knowledge of gender is, in fact, a changeable and revisable reality
(1990: xxiii)

The subversive repetition is constituted by the idea that there is no reality, that the
supposedly natural reality of femininity is produced. When repetitions build on one
another, they seem not to be repetitions at all, but rather the actions of a consistent
and unified self. Agency exists when this radical uncertainty is exposed.

Reading the fictional character as a subversive repetition
My argument here is that the realist fictional character, like the human subject, can be
read as a series of repetitions, which secures its ‘identity’. The character is signified,
written, through its construction in language. The character is built through a series
of incidents that repeat and resignify who the character is, reminiscent of the gendered
subject who repeats and resignifies the norms of gender. The character of Jane is
repeated throughout the text of Jane Eyre, first as a young girl who’s lost her parents,
then as a governess who travels to Thornfield, then as a young woman travelling, etc.
There are hundreds of incidents throughout the text that assert and reassert who ‘Jane
Eyre’ is.

As reader response theory has documented, fictional characters can shift for readers –
what we focus on in one reading may seem merely a detail in another. However there
are limits to how far this transformative repetition can extend. Like the human
subject who is signified through ‘a regulated process of repetition that both conceals
itself and enforces its rules’ (Butler 1990: 185), the fictional character must also
adhere to regulated processes of repetition. The fictional character of ‘Jane’ may
seem earnest and hard-working to the reader or she may seem whiny and selfish. But
wherever the reader's sympathies rest, she will be read as a series of repetitions that
see her as a child in the Red Room, to arriving at Thornfield, to teaching Adele.
‘Jane’ is regulated by limitations: she is a woman, she is an orphan, she is a
governess, etc. These limitations are a direct consequence of her creation. Any writer
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writing in the realist mode writes a character that builds and grows on her previous
depictions. While there can be an infinite number of responses to a character, the
character is regulated by the author’s choices and any repetition of character must take
into account earlier repetitions of character. Certainly in realist circles, Jane Eyre
could not turn into a rampaging wildebeest in the last chapter of the book.

If the realist fictional character can be read as a series of repetitions, it follows that
when their construction is exposed or subverted, they can act as a site of Butlerian
agency or radical uncertainty. But how can a realist character (as opposed to the
reflexive postmodern character) draw attention to its construction within the limits of
narrative? The character’s role in a realist text circumvents drawing attention to itself
as constructed. When I teach subjects in prose fiction, I implore students to draft and
redraft their work to eliminate clunky mistakes – so readers can immerse themselves
in the fictional world being established without being reminded of the text’s
construction. However, one way the realist fictional character can demonstrate
agency is through texts that force readers to question previous character depictions:
that is, rewriting. Authors can rewrite texts in the realist mode, creating a new series
of repetitions that expose the constructed nature of character. Reading rewritten texts
for repetition and subversion/agency involves analyzing and interrogating texts to see
where they simply propagate existing structures and where they question and
undermine those structures (structures in this case being monolithic story-telling,
illusions of cohesive identities, gender paradigms, the ‘novel’, et cetera).

I would argue that Jean Rhys’s Wide Sargasso Sea is a quintessential example of a
rewritten text whose characters question their previous depictions and display Butler’s
notion of agency. Written in 1966, Wide Sargasso Sea chronicles the experiences of
Bertha – the mad woman in the attic from Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre – before she
was incarcerated in Thornfield Hall. Rhys renames Bertha as Antoinette and details
her life in the West Indies and early marriage to Edward Rochester (though Rhys
chooses to unname him, taking away his patriarchal signifier). Bertha/Antoinette is
comprised of a series of repetitions, which determine her character. In Jane Eyre, we
first hear Bertha (though Jane and the first-time reader are not aware of her identity)
through her laughter, via Jane Eyre’s consciousness: ‘While I paced softly on, the last
sound I expected to hear in so still a region, a laugh struck my ear’ (Brontë, 122).
Jane asks Mrs Fairfax, the housekeeper, whose laughter it is and is mollified (albeit
reluctantly) that it belongs to the servant Grace Poole. The repetitions that comprise
Bertha – more laughter, her attack on Mr Mason – climax when Jane discovers her in
the attic, as Mr Rochester’s wife: ‘What it was, whether beast or human being, one
could not, at first sight, tell: it groveled, seemingly, on all fours; it snatched and
growled like some strange wild animal’ (Brontë, 328). The actual text devoted to
Bertha in Jane Eyre is minimal. While she is a strategic symbol for Brontë’s plot (she
keeps Jane from achieving her desire for a romantic connection to Mr Rochester), her
character is given little space within the text.
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Jean Rhys’s Antoinette is not a separate character from Bertha. She is an addition of
repetitions to the character of Bertha. Even though Rhys is a different author from
Brontë, the process of writing, or expanding upon, the character is not different. Rhys
must adhere to the previous depictions of Bertha’s character. That is, Rhys must
write a believable continuation of who Bertha might be – otherwise readers will doubt
it is the same character. Like the repetitions of gender, any reappropriation of Bertha
is highly regulated in that it must, in some way, be linked to its previous depiction.
The reappropriation is confined by the character it expands upon. Rhys can only
rewrite Brontë’s Bertha by keeping within the confines of who Bertha might
believably be. However, simply because there are rules and regulations about who
Bertha can be, does not mean that she is determined. By giving Bertha subject status
and writing a self into the story of the mad woman in the attic, Rhys not only
questions Brontë’s version of Bertha but revolts against it. As Helen Tiffin states,
Wide Sargasso Sea is a ‘canonical counter-discourse’ that ‘takes up a character or
characters, or the basic assumptions of a British canonical text, and unveils those
assumptions, subverting the text for post-colonial purposes’ (1987: 22). Sylvie
Maurel agrees: ‘Retracing the genesis of her madness, Jean Rhys undertakes to
emancipate Bertha from the debilitating straitjacket of stereotyped and nonplausible
characterization’ (1998: 152). By shifting and mutating the ‘original’ character, and
privileging different stories than Brontë, Rhys is able to re-vision (in Adrienne Rich’s
sense of the word) the novel and question the monolithic story-telling of Jane Eyre.
It must be noted there are many narrative facets to Rhys’ re-construction of
Brontë’s text that make Antoinette viable as a subversive repetition of Bertha and
indeed I would argue that other characters (such as the nameless Rochester) who also
question their previous depictions. I do not have space to elaborate fully here but
matters such as the use of multiple perspectives, re-naming, temporal shifts and tone
are critical to this enterprise as well as the developed characterization.

Ethics and a Butlerian theory of character: should we all rewrite texts?
I have postulated that we can read fictional characters metaphorically in the way
Butler reads the gendered subject. Further, I argue that this reading is an ethical
enterprise because it disrupts humanist assumptions regarding character. The western
liberal character can be compelling. I must admit, in earlier drafts of this paper, I was
concerned with how we could use repetitions as a writerly tool in crafting characters
and ended up propagating the very notions of western liberal selfhood that Judith
Butler writes against. In a different vein, my creative writing students are drawn to
the idea that characters ‘come to them’ and ‘write themselves’ – that planning plot
points and character revelations is somehow counter to the creative project of novel
writing. This attitude endows characters with a ‘selfhood’ that is capable of intention
and action. Reading characters as Butlerian repetitions doesn’t let the author (or
reader) relax into this romantic view of character yet it still actively accounts for the
mimetic component of realist fictional characters. Like the subject, the character's
performative repetitions offer the illusion of a prior and volitional self, which is why
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concepts of self-consciousness and ‘personhood’ must be taken into account in any
viable theory of character.

So what are the practicalities of reading characters as Butlerian repetitions? Should
we all stop creating characters and rewrite existing ones? Maybe we should commit
to writing postmodern texts that draw attention to their constructions? I shy away
from this strategy because the realist character is more compelling for me than the
self-referential character because it mimics the illusion of a cohesive and unified self
in a way that the postmodern character generally cannot. However it’s also important
to remember that a rewritten character is not necessarily subversive. In fact, if not
done carefully rewriting can run the risk of writing over silenced narratives. As well,
it’s possible to rewrite a text and simply extend it rather than question it – such as
Emma Tennant’s Emma in Love (1997) that chronicles Emma’s life two years after
the Jane Austen novel finishes. Writing subversive characters is not simply a matter
of changing authors, it’s about exposing the constructed nature of the fictional
character and the narrative hegemony. Also, it’s not necessary to actually re-write a
novel to consider, or re-consider, the representations of character therein. Thus, I ask
writers and readers to ruminate on the narratives hidden within narratives. Of course I
take on board that this is problematic (in light of assuming ‘intentioning selfhood’).
That is, I’m making liberal assumptions about writers and readers. However I posit
that this questioning can be read as a political act, especially in light of an ethics of
representation.

In conclusion
The idea of questioning dominant textual narratives is not new. However this paper
has tried to shed light on why this process can be critical. By reading fictional
characters as Butlerian gendered subjects, we don’t question the character as a sign of
the subject, but rather the subject as its referent. Reading for agency, for the radical
uncertainty of the realist character, reminds us that the illusion of a cohesive unified
narrative, while seductive, is problematic especially in light of issues of
representation.
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